Node Consensus Network (NCN) Grants Committee

Title:

Node Consensus Network (NCN) Grants Committee

Category:

Treasury

Abstract:

This proposal requests 10 million JTO funds from the Jito DAO to manage a grants program specifically aimed at incentivizing Node Consensus Networks (NCN’s, roughly analogous to AVS’s) developers to utilize the forthcoming Jito (Re)staking product.

Grants will be divided into three categories: Development Grants, which will be awarded based on estimated economic activity generated by the NCN; Production Grants, which will offer NCN’s tiered liquidity mining/security mining rewards based on economic activity benchmarks once the NCN is live; and Futarchy Grants, which will have similar goals to the Development Grants, but utilize the MetaDAO platform for decision making.

The funds will be managed by a multi-sig committee consisting of Jito Foundation members and Jito DAO delegates with the intention of distributing or earmarking all funds within one year after the passing of the proposal.

Motivation:

The forthcoming Jito (Re)staking product has the potential to become a core part of the Jito Network’s offering, driving the protocol forward in terms of both TVL and fees generated. The codebase for Jito (Re)staking has recently been made public and is currently being prepared for audit. Details regarding Jito (Re)staking’s functionality can be found here.

Once live, there are several constituent communities that will populate the Jito (Re)staking ecosystem, including: node operators, stakers/restakers, Vault Receipt Token issuers (VRTs being roughly analogous to LRTs), vault managers, and NCN developers.

Based on the Jito Network’s position in the liquid staking landscape and the success of initial business development outreach from the Jito Foundation, Jito (Re)staking is in prime position to capture a dominant share of all component ecosystem stakeholders, many of whom already participate in the Jito Network in some form and are eager to utilize the restaking product. This will help establish Jito (Re)staking as not just the leading restaking solution on Solana, but also across the broader crypto ecosystem.

However, NCN developers arguably serve as the engine for any staking or restaking system, and at the moment appear to be the scarcest type of participant. While other restaking projects have proven to be extremely successful in attracting gaudy total value locked (TVL) sums, perhaps a stronger measure of success for a staking/restaking system should be the amount of economic value it generates – specifically, the amount of value it manages to distribute to node operators, VRT issuers, and restakers for their services. NCN’s are the participants that ultimately drive this value.

The Jito Foundation has held conversations with a number of current and potential NCN developers, including existing Solana protocols as well as forthcoming projects. Many have expressed interest in Jito (Re)staking, but may have other development priorities or competing offers from other solutions. This grants program will be essential in incentivizing developers to focus on building out their NCN systems and rewarding NCN’s that drive economic value.

This grants program is largely inspired by the Arbitrum STIP and LTIPP programs. In these programs, the Arbitrum Foundation provided ARB to third-party projects for the sole purpose of liquidity mining. Multiple analyses from research firms indicate that the programs were successful at driving key ecosystem metrics and economic value, including volumes, users, and TVL. However, multiple analysts, including Jito DAO delegate Blockworks Research, found that the incentives had mixed efficacy in terms of retention.

The Arbitrum programs entailed significant governance, recordkeeping, and administrative loads, and as such this Grants program is significantly trimmed down – both in the dollar amount of incentives on offer, as well as the administrative overhead.

It is difficult to model an economic system that does not yet exist, and indeed has never existed. There is as yet no fully live restaking platform that features a fully-functional AVS/NCN with staking, slashing, and rewards being paid out.

As such, this grants program proposal makes significant assumptions as to what shape the Jito (Re)staking NCN ecosystem might take, as well as assumptions regarding the efficacy of liquidity mining (or, in this case, economic security mining) relative to economic value generated by a hypothetical NCN.

There may have to be significant alterations made to the program in future governance proposals in order to ensure that incentives are being paid to the right parties and at the appropriate scale to achieve the goal of encouraging economic value flow.

Ultimately, the Foundation views this grants program as the first push that sets the Jito (Re)staking flywheel in motion, ensuring that it becomes a hub of economic activity rather than a dead weight of unproductive TVL.

Key Terms:

  • Jito (Re)staking:

Jito (Re)staking is a multi-asset staking protocol for Node Consensus Networks.

The protocol tokenizes staked assets as Vault Receipt Tokens for enhanced liquidity and composability.

Node consensus networks can use Jito (Re)staking to easily customize staking parameters, slashing conditions, and economic incentives to tailor their security and tokenomics.

  • (Re)staking:

The Jito Foundation’s lightly branded term for what is frequently referred to as “restaking” without the parentheticals. Because Jito (Re)staking can support both staked assets, such as JitoSOL, or any non-staked SPL token, Jito (Re)staking’s name emphasizes that the product can function either as a staking platform or a restaking platform.

  • NCN:

An acronym for Node Consensus Network, a term for a discrete economy of restakers, node operators, and delegation/vault managers that require economic security, incentives, or node operator infrastructure to reach consensus regarding the performance of a blockchain-based service.

  • VRT:

Deposits into Jito (Re)staking vaults are tracked with vault receipt tokens. Not all VRTs will be liquid, but many will function as either liquid staked tokens or liquid restaked tokens.

  • Economic activity:

The measure of yield that a NCN provides to node operators, stakers/restakers, and VRT issuers/managers.

  • (Re)stakers:

Users willing to stake or restake their assets in a NCN system.

  • Node operators:

Entities that accept delegated stake from users and perform operations within a NCN in exchange for economic value.

  • Delegation/vault managers:

Providers of Vault Receipt Tokens (VRTs) that analyze NCN’s, node operators, and attempt to manage risk for stakers and/or restakers.

Specification:

This proposal will send 10 million JTO to a 4-of-6 multisig controlled by three Jito Foundation members and three Jito DAO delegates to manage the potential payouts related to the NCN grants program.

The grants will be divided into three categories:

  • Development Grants
  • Production Grants
  • Futarchy Grants

Development Grants: These grants, for up to 75,000 JTO, are designed to cover the initial costs of NCN development and/or to incentivize existing protocols to prioritize NCN deployment.

These grants will be distributed to projects based on a Grants Committee review of proposals. Proposals will be evaluated primarily on the basis of estimated potential future economic value driven to the Jito (Re)staking ecosystem, as subjectively determined by the Grants Committee. A unanimous vote will be required for grant approvals. Grant applicants will undergo a KYC and vetting process, and a full application, modeled after STIP application, can be viewed here.

Half of each Development Grant will be awarded immediately upon successfully passing evaluation from the Committee, while the remaining half will be awarded subject to a vesting period once the relevant NCN launches on Solana mainnet with an arbitrary amount of participating node operators and an arbitrary amount of value initially staked.

The second half of each grant will be vested at the end of a twelve month period from the date of the grant award and can be rescinded in the event of an NCN developer abandoning their project or maliciously attacking the network.

Production Grants: Production grants will be awarded to NCN projects on the basis of economic value generated by a network once the network has gone live. These funds will be specifically earmarked for liquidity or economic security mining.

Economic value will be measured by the amount of fees awarded to node operators, LRT issuers, and restakers by an NCN system in dollar terms, measured at the time of transaction. Production grants will:

  • Reward NCN developers with LM funds at a $10-to-$1 basis ($1 in grant funds per $10 in value generated), up to a maximum of $1,000,000 in grant funds.
  • Be available for up to one calendar year after the NCN’s deployment to mainnet.
  • Become eligible at the milestones of $100,000, $1 million, and $10 million in value generated.
  • Become eligible for award immediately upon reaching the relevant milestone.

The 10-to-1 ratio is based on a key set of assumptions:

  • On a medium-to-long term time horizon, restakers will be motivated to participate in NCN’s (and in the process take on additional smart contract and slashing risk) by yields in the 0.5%-5% range, depending on the risks associated with the particular NCN.
  • Using this assumption as a benchmark, an NCN that has issued $1 million in value over a one-year period likely has attracted a sum of economic security somewhere between $20 million (for 5% yield) and $200 million (for 0.5% yield).
  • At a 10-to-1 ratio of incentives granted to economic activity generated, the impact of incentives will rely heavily on how much economic security a particular project has already attracted, but regardless still make a material impact on returns – therefore helping an NCN attract additional economic security, which will ideally attract more users for the NCN and in the end generate more economic activity.

While the north star goal of the Production Grants program is to generate additional economic activity, a 10-to-1 ratio likely also correlates with economic security deposit gains for the NCN that will benefit Jito’s TVL at a favorable rate compared with direct liquidity mining schemes.

An example project progressing through Development Grants and Production Grants:

SuperSolana is a hypothetical SVM L2 that intends to use an NCN of multiple provers to ensure the correctness of its blocks. SuperSolana utilizes both JitoSOL and its native token, SUPER for economic security, and pays rewards to in SUPER.

After receiving a 25,000 JTO Development Grant, SuperSolana is immediately awarded 12,500 JTO and utilizes the funds for development costs. Two months later, after deploying its NCN to mainnet with four node operators and attaining $10m in TVL/economic security, SuperSolana has fulfilled the conditions to begin a one-year vest for the second half of its Development Grant, totalling another 12,500 JTO.

Growing quickly on the back of both SUPER incentive emissions as well as SUPER NCN network fees, three months later SuperSolana exceeds $1,000,000 in SUPER rewards distributed to NCN participants, becoming eligible for a $100,000 JTO liquidity mining grant. A year later, as SuperSolana becomes a highly successful chain, SuperSolana exceeds $10 million in rewards paid, and becomes eligible for a $1,000,000 JTO liquidity mining grant.

Both projects that did and did not receive Development Grants will be eligible for Production Grants. Projects which wish to receive Production Grants will be responsible for tracking their value generated and subsidies paid via native token incentives, and will submit their accounting to the Grants Committee for verification prior to receiving their award distribution. Additionally, recipients will be responsible for disclosing to the DAO their awards.

The Grants Committee will have arbitrary and subjective discretion to decline granting LM budgets to projects it deems either predatory or unsustainable – for instance, an NCN that provides no service and merely inflates the circulating supply of a memecoin to stakers.

For NCN’s to receive production grants, they should not be using NCN token rewards that enable wash/spoofed metrics. The committee will take into consideration each NCN’s own security mining program, and ideally this security mining program should incentivize demand side and not supply side metrics.

Additionally, the Jito Foundation has a number of NCN’s in development internally. None of these funds will be directed to NCN’s developed by any Jito entity, including the Foundation or Jito Labs.

Unspent funds are to be returned to the Grants Committee at the end of a 12-month period from the date of the grant award.

Futarchy Grants: 100,000 JTO will be allocated to Futarchy Grants to be administered by MetaDAO’s decision markets platform. Jito would create a DAO with a base token of JTO, its initial parameters would be 3% for pass threshold and $10,000 in liquidity to generate a proposal. These proposals accept basic instructions: transfer, burn, memo. Of which can affect the DAO, configuration parameters and the Futarchic DAO treasury.

To begin, Jito will elect to place no funds in its treasury until at least four proposals have been produced. The instructions from the proposals are to be adhered to accordingly, but while under experimentation, non-binding.

The goals of these grants will be similar to Development Grants, but leveraging a measured approach to decision markets, a novel approach to governance. A proposal which exists or has existed under Development Grants cannot apply for the same grant under Futarchy Grants. This expresses a commitment from Jito to take innovative approaches to decentralization and support for communities building on Solana.

Benefits/Risks:

Benefits:

  • Incentives and grants will help establish Jito (Re)staking at a crucial time in the development of the restaking space. There is a possibility that Jito’s product will be the first to market with full functionality, providing an avenue for Jito to become the leading staking and restaking provider not just on Solana, but across the crypto ecosystem.

Risks:

  • It is not a certainty that incentivizing NCN’s will help grow economic activity
  • The Grants Committee will have significant, centralized discretion
  • Malicious actors may evade the Committee’s oversight and develop schemes to obtain grants with no intention of creating economic value

Outcomes:

The passing of this proposal will result in 10 million JTO being sent to a multisig with the purpose of being issued as grants over a period of one year. If there are unspent funds at the end of one year they will be returned to the DAO.

4 Likes

There is a lot of detail and a lot to unpack here.

Restaking is certainly an exciting prospect. Looking at it here from the DAO’s perspective my immediate questions are how this benefits jitoSOL and/or JTO.

I feel like we still lack some clear definition of the DAO’s objectives and vision, but it is important that the treasury is managed with the best interests of the DAO and ultimately therefore the jitoSOL stake pool in mind.

If a significant sum of JTO is allocated to restaking grants, how will this ensure advancement of jitoSOL and the stake pool? Will there be stipulations to use jitoSOL or JTO as tokens in the NCNs such as mentioned in the supersolana example? How does this generate fees to jitoSOL ultimately?

Taking a further step back I’d welcome an overall roadmap to be developed and approved by the DAO to guide the Jito Foundation and Jito Labs teams in their choice of product development and ensure alignment from the outset.

1 Like

Excellent points.

For context, a forthcoming proposal will place parts of Jito (Re)staking governance under the control of the Jito DAO. This will include platform fees – which were mentioned briefly in the proposal, but clearly needs to be expanded upon – which will be routed to the DAO treasury. The Foundation is still determining what rates to recommend the DAO initially sets, but we’ll have that proposal live in the coming weeks.

This has a lot of bearing on your points. For start, this transforms the Jito DAO from being primarily focused on LST governance, to instead being focused on the broader Jito Network – a collection of synergistic and interconnected protocols driving fees to the DAO. Through this lens, the proposal is for customer acquisition costs of networks that will ideally drive fees to the DAO in perpetuity, not grants for a project with only ancillary benefits for the LST.

To answer other questions: we anticipate this will increase JitoSOL TVL, but that’s impossible to model as we don’t know which NCNs will use what forms of collateral. We will make no stipulations to NCNs, as the protocol is designed to be a composable network. Fees will be generated as described above.

The Foundation can be credibly accused here of putting the cart before the horse by drafting a grants proposal prior to the fee JIP going live/passing, but we feel the competitive edge in having a program in place is significant enough to justify the speed.

2 Likes

Grant Matching
One takeaway from our STIP operational analysis for Arbitrum was that we found that matching grants in some capacity may be beneficial for proper fund usage. By this we mean if the DAO is distributing X amount of capital to an NCN, then that NCN may need to distribute Y amount of capital in return. We find that this would likely help with protocol alignment, and would help funds be disbursed more properly in line with growth. This would likely be a fit for the production grant sector. This would also be helpful for preventing protocols from misusing/running off with the funds, as we had found with two prior participants in STIP.

General idea on Cascade Risk
Although it’s still very early and the idea isn’t fully developed, we believe that alongside focusing on growth, it’s important to consider how we can tangibly measure cascade risk. The number of “risky” NCNs is significant because if a group of users is slashed, the restaking layer (Jito) would lose capital, making it more vulnerable. This vulnerability could potentially trigger a cascading risk effect, where one NCN’s failure might lead to others toppling as well. While this is unlikely, we certainly think that this is something to be kept in mind for the approval process and for how we approach the economic value and risk management of the NCNs in question. See here for additional info

Futarchy Discussion
Given the earlier discussion on the call about the nature of the MetaDAO Futarchy grants, we’re overall in favor of the idea, but we would like to see a greater discussion over configurations for the creation of the prediction market. According to the MetaDAO documents, the parameters for configuration are:

  • Proposal time: how long the proposal should be active for.
  • Pass threshold/Quorum: The percentage that the pass price needs to be above for a decision to occur.
  • Min liquidity: The minimum liquidity needed to lock in proposal markets, specified in USDC and the DAO token.
  • TWAP sensitivity parameters: The price contributing to the TWAP is limited to the dollar amount per minute. Each DAO is responsible for determining the limit.

DAO-Involvement
Otherwise, we would encourage delegates and the Foundation to pursue a greater proposal on value generation from restaking as a separate discussion. We think that there could be productive ways for this value to accrue back to the treasury in some capacity.

Overall, we are in favor of this proposal and would like to see it move forward. With our experience in grants committees and incentive design elsewhere we are open to participating in this committee.

2 Likes

Pleased to see this proposal come forward. It’s clear that the foundation has spent ample time researching, and understanding the pros and cons of other restaking platforms and incorporating those into the (Re)Staking design for Jito.

I would echo similar concerns that Blockworks raised with regards to the futarchy grants, however that is also the area I’m most intrigued with, and I believe this market-based system could, in the long term, ultimately become a superior grant allocator as opposed to an arbitrary committee.

I think the chosen futarchy parameters are fine for launch, and they can of course be adjusted if need be in the future.

As for development grants, I think the parameters and vesting period makes sense and I’m pleased to see similar past programs like Arbitrum’s STIP program be adequately analyzed and criticized to ensure best practices with Jito’s version.

On production grants, I think the general idea of rewarding NCNs that are working well is a good idea. However, it is a bit unclear as to the speed at which the grant will be emitted.

Say an NCN is making $1m in value generated, so they are eligible for $100k of JTO liquidity mining. Is the $100k of JTO vested immediately & can be used by the team at their own discretion?

Also, I assume that a team can be awarded production grants on more than one occasion? Perhaps there should be a limit, or a diminishing amount awarded each time to ensure the NCN, and its restakers, don’t rely on continuous exogenous yield in the form of JTO?

Overall, I think this proposal provides a solid amount of depth and thought on creating a sustainable restaking ecosystem marketplace for NCNs. Given my company, Kairos Research, spends a great deal of time working with other restaking projects around the Ethereum ecosystem, I would be open to contributing to NCN grant committee.

2 Likes

Here are two quick follow up questions from us:

  • What mechanisms are in place to ensure that the governance process remains transparent and inclusive as new stakeholders join?

  • I am a fan of the 10 to 1 ratio; it helps empirically assess results. How often are these grants being assessed?

Hey there folks and sorry for the delay at getting around to this.

Kollan from MetaDAO here and excited to see Jito engaged to push forward an experiment with grants and futarchy.

I’ve gone through with some recommended settings when initializing the DAO under the futarchy as a service platform:

  • Pass Threshold BPS - The % Pass TWAP needs to be above Fail TWAP for the proposal to pass.
    • 300 (3%)
  • Slots Per Proposal - The length of time in slots the conditional markets are active and evaluated for a proposal.
    • 648_000 (~3 days)
  • Min Quote Futarchic Liquidity - The minimum amount deposited for the quote side of the AMM when creating a proposal.
    • 25_000_000_000 ($25k USDC)
  • Min Base Futarchic Liquidity - The minimum amount deposited for the base side of the AMM when creating a proposal.
    • 10_500_000_000_000 (10.5k JTO)
  • Twap Initial Observation - Where the TWAP begins its initial observation.
    • 2_300_000_000 ($2.30)
  • Twap Max Observation Change Per Update - The maximum amount TWAP is able to change in ~ 1 min time.
    • 50_000_000 ($0.05)
  1. These parameters once set are able to be updated via a proposal utilizing the same mechanism.
  2. The liquidity provisioning is a means of spam prevention as well as providing enough liquidity to enable a fluid trading environment. MetaDAO will be deploying proposals in coordination with Jito Foundation and provide the liquidity for proposals initially.
    • MetaDAO will acquire the required amount of JTO tokens for the MetaDAO treasury to be used when creating proposals.
  3. The initial observation is set around current spot price.

To see a configured dao account structure on chain: Anchor Account Data | CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9 | Solana

Happy to discuss the above and offer any additional insight required.

2 Likes