Thanks all for the input on this thread.
The primary concern appears to be regarding the introduction of validator age as a metric and the potential impact this has on newer validators. On this point and others, it is worth noting that it is impossible to foresee how this will play out in the Stake Pool until it is deployed.
The significant expansion of the stake pool size to 400 validators will ensure that there is a far wider participation in the stake pool and it is likely that there will be sufficient space in the pool for new validators to enter and compete on the first two metrics of commission rate, and Jito MEV commission. A move where validator age acted as the primary metric would have a far more dramatic impact on newer validators, which is why it is situated as the third tier ranking metric.
It is worth noting that validator age is primarily in place to eliminate malicious operators from the pool and is an essential pairing mechanic with the blacklisting functions set up in JIP-22 and JIP-23. Without validator age it would be trivial for blacklisted validators to re-enter, or sybil the pool.
This new structure down ranks the importance of vote credits (which had trended towards aggressive PvP tactics) to a fourth level “tie breaker” metric, which does mean that performance is still dynamic in the pool. We do not at this point know how often it will be used to determine the set composition, but its presence does mean that performance is still a prime driver of stake delegation. Additionally, the floor on performance has been raised to ensure that only performant validators can enter the pool.
A similar situation is likely to occur on the issue of any possible race to zero dynamics, again the doubled stake pool size should provide sufficient space for a market develop allowing people to alter their commission rates dynamically that maximise their utility functions within the pool. Following these changes, Jito MEV commissions will be averaged over 30 epochs (as opposed to their highest setting in the window) allowing validators to shape their rank based on immediate changes of their commission rates facilitating a fluid market structure in the pool above 0/0. Again, we don’t know exactly how this will play out until JIP-25 is passed and a new steady state equilibrium is established. It will be possible in a future JIP to expand the stake pool size further if this improves the game dynamics.
There are some very interesting ideas emerging here including the inclusion of geo-spatial distribution as a dynamic, referral schemes, integration of SFDP criteria etc. All of these introduce degrees of subjectivity, engineering complexity, the requirement for manned intermediary structures and varying degrees of human-in-the-loop permissioning that run contrary to the philosophy of permissionless DeFi that is important to be the base layer of Jito Network economy.
More advanced selectivity elements are being introduced in the Directed Staking proposal in the Drafts section on the forum, which it would be ideal to get your feedback on. This will allow network entities such as DeFi projects to participate in the pool which will encourage expansion of JitoSOL TVL. JIP-25 should be considered the first in a series of stake pool evolutions that trend towards a more ideal structure for as many validators as possible, whilst balancing network health and JitoSOL growth.
It is also important to understand the available design space we have to work with via StakeNet and the Steward programme in the short term. We are operating within a decentralised and permissionless system, with hard engineering requirements each time this system is altered. JIP-25 is the first iteration towards a new structure, but certainly not the end form.
In Summary:
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The changes in JIP-25 immediately address the negative PvP dynamics that have emerged due to an emphasis on vote credits as the primary ranking dynamic and is a significant improvement on the status quo.
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The concerns around new validators are valid and it is suggested that we monitor this closely. If the new design significantly limits the ability for high quality operators to enter the pool legitimately, then future iterations of the system should be considered that allow newer validators to enter and compete.
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It is not possible to credibly predict what the stake pool structure will look like until the changes are implemented and the changes have fully churned through the system.
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JIP-25 is an incremental improvement to the stake pool dynamics, future changes are possible and this is not the final form. It will be possible to monitor the new equilibrium that emerges after this change and make future adjustments and add additional criteria.
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We value all contributions and feedback here, all of the inputs will be listened to and credible enhancements to the stake pool dynamics will be considered thoroughly. Post execution, this thread will become a place where continued discourse on the state of the pool will continue and future iterations will be theorised in public.