JIP-25 - Expand the Validator Set and Modify Jito Stake Pool Eligibility and Ranking Criteria

JIP - Official
21

I do recognize that the motivations outlined in the proposal are very valid.
But there’s a range of concerns being raised here, that seem reasonable enough to warrant more discussion.

The logic behind discouraging inefficient performance tuning and curbing excessive profitability makes sense. But if that’s the case, why not design something that incorporates other important signals? Adding offchain or more complex inputs raises management challenges, but at least, I don’t see this proposal as a clear improvement on the status quo.

22

I see the reasoning for using age to discourage sybil churn, but it does tilt the playing field against newer validators. Something I did notice is that this is part of the groundwork for the directed staking. Do you anticipate this being temporary until directed staking comes online, or will there be other mechanisms to ensure emerging validators still have a pathway to get JitoSOL stake? If so, I don’t see validator age being used as a tie breaker as much of a problem.

23

Thanks all for the input on this thread.

The primary concern appears to be regarding the introduction of validator age as a metric and the potential impact this has on newer validators. On this point and others, it is worth noting that it is impossible to foresee how this will play out in the Stake Pool until it is deployed.

The significant expansion of the stake pool size to 400 validators will ensure that there is a far wider participation in the stake pool and it is likely that there will be sufficient space in the pool for new validators to enter and compete on the first two metrics of commission rate, and Jito MEV commission. A move where validator age acted as the primary metric would have a far more dramatic impact on newer validators, which is why it is situated as the third tier ranking metric.

It is worth noting that validator age is primarily in place to eliminate malicious operators from the pool and is an essential pairing mechanic with the blacklisting functions set up in JIP-22 and JIP-23. Without validator age it would be trivial for blacklisted validators to re-enter, or sybil the pool.

This new structure down ranks the importance of vote credits (which had trended towards aggressive PvP tactics) to a fourth level “tie breaker” metric, which does mean that performance is still dynamic in the pool. We do not at this point know how often it will be used to determine the set composition, but its presence does mean that performance is still a prime driver of stake delegation. Additionally, the floor on performance has been raised to ensure that only performant validators can enter the pool.

A similar situation is likely to occur on the issue of any possible race to zero dynamics, again the doubled stake pool size should provide sufficient space for a market develop allowing people to alter their commission rates dynamically that maximise their utility functions within the pool. Following these changes, Jito MEV commissions will be averaged over 30 epochs (as opposed to their highest setting in the window) allowing validators to shape their rank based on immediate changes of their commission rates facilitating a fluid market structure in the pool above 0/0. Again, we don’t know exactly how this will play out until JIP-25 is passed and a new steady state equilibrium is established. It will be possible in a future JIP to expand the stake pool size further if this improves the game dynamics.

There are some very interesting ideas emerging here including the inclusion of geo-spatial distribution as a dynamic, referral schemes, integration of SFDP criteria etc. All of these introduce degrees of subjectivity, engineering complexity, the requirement for manned intermediary structures and varying degrees of human-in-the-loop permissioning that run contrary to the philosophy of permissionless DeFi that is important to be the base layer of Jito Network economy.

More advanced selectivity elements are being introduced in the Directed Staking proposal in the Drafts section on the forum, which it would be ideal to get your feedback on. This will allow network entities such as DeFi projects to participate in the pool which will encourage expansion of JitoSOL TVL. JIP-25 should be considered the first in a series of stake pool evolutions that trend towards a more ideal structure for as many validators as possible, whilst balancing network health and JitoSOL growth.

It is also important to understand the available design space we have to work with via StakeNet and the Steward programme in the short term. We are operating within a decentralised and permissionless system, with hard engineering requirements each time this system is altered. JIP-25 is the first iteration towards a new structure, but certainly not the end form.

In Summary:

  • The changes in JIP-25 immediately address the negative PvP dynamics that have emerged due to an emphasis on vote credits as the primary ranking dynamic and is a significant improvement on the status quo.

  • The concerns around new validators are valid and it is suggested that we monitor this closely. If the new design significantly limits the ability for high quality operators to enter the pool legitimately, then future iterations of the system should be considered that allow newer validators to enter and compete.

  • It is not possible to credibly predict what the stake pool structure will look like until the changes are implemented and the changes have fully churned through the system.

  • JIP-25 is an incremental improvement to the stake pool dynamics, future changes are possible and this is not the final form. It will be possible to monitor the new equilibrium that emerges after this change and make future adjustments and add additional criteria.

  • We value all contributions and feedback here, all of the inputs will be listened to and credible enhancements to the stake pool dynamics will be considered thoroughly. Post execution, this thread will become a place where continued discourse on the state of the pool will continue and future iterations will be theorised in public.

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24

Thanks for the update here.

I would also suggest that perhaps you keep the top 200 with maybe 25% or more stake than the remaining 200. Reason being because there are people (including us) that are running a validator with a custom mods and adding more engineering effort + better hardware to stay in the top 200. I think those efforts should be rewarded a with a bit more stake otherwise we would be slightly disincentivized to further improve our validator infra to compete with the Top 200. Thus it is more of a merit based system.

Essentially a tiered stake:

  • Tier 1: 1–200 (200 spots)

  • Tier 2: 201–300 (100 spots)

  • Tier 3: 301–400 (100 spots)

2 Likes
25

Blockworks Advisory supports this proposal and will be voting Yes.

Generally speaking, we think aiming to fix the TVC arms-race incentive and broadening the set is a good idea. We would just like to add ideas to the pool for anti-incumbent entrenchment, so that age isn’t the velvet rope for participation.

We think it’s best to start with low-complexity solutions as a sort of “bandaid” until a more dynamic one can be found. Maybe it’s a good idea to simply have 10% of seats for qualified newer validators with some rotation, or an age cap decay where after some amount additional age confers diminishing returns on advantage. Age should be a hurdle, not a permanent moat. We want to support the idea that it might be a good idea to reserve a percentage for validators below an age threshold who meet other standards such as being SFDP-qualified, etc. At the same time, we recognize @drnick’s point about these being hard-coded subjective solutions.

With that in mind, the age cap/decay is of the most importance, this would have no subjectivity, we could treat age as sybil friction and not a lifelong moat. There are two options here, introducing a hard cap where age past X epochs adds no extra advantage or introducing a more dynamic system where marginal seniority fades out. Long-term operators still benefit, but newcomers are not entirely boxed out in this scenario.

So, let’s say: age score (a) = min (1 - e^(-a/60), a/120, 1)

Early age ramps quickly here, but by 120 epochs, extra seniority effectively flattens, age helps but doesn’t dominate forever. Ranking order remains unchanged and TVC can still be the tie breaker.

Bottom line, we think JIP-25 is directionally right, a small newcomer reservation and maybe an age-decay could keep the set open to new credible validators.

1 Like
27

I completely agree. It’s an extremely rational idea that also takes into account the forum discussions. I was disappointed to see that Jito has given up on finding effective solutions in response to constructive criticism.

28

At Tané, we vote against this JIP because we are against the idea of introducing the validator age as a metric in the ranking logic as we raised concerns in the forum JIP-25 - Expand the Validator Set and Modify Jito Stake Pool Eligibility and Ranking Criteria - #14 by Tane and not fully convinced of the reasonings provided by the core team. We still stand by our opinion and consider this change, even though it’s deemed as the first iteration, is not better than the status quo, but rather net-negative to the Jito and Solana ecosystem.

29

Great proposal. Expanding the validator set and refining eligibility criteria is a good move to improve decentralization and strengthen performance across the network. We like the focus on transparency and metrics, it’s key for long-term trust. A periodic review of the criteria could also help fine-tune the results over time. Overall, strong direction for the Jito ecosystem.

30

I feel ending pvp is an important and time critical step.

Age req for new validators is only a tie breaker and I feel will not discourage or disadvantage new validators who truly motivated to create & solve problems.

It is a short term solution, as I feel more creditable and aligned metrics such as ingenuity and long term chain benefit could be created and those heros rewarded.

This fixes a real problem with only a minor drawback.

These are my observations. I am in favor of this change however imperfect it may be.

Thank you

31

This promotes a race to zero on fees. Although delegators may benefit from reduced costs with 0% commission validators, it can produce uneven results among validators. Ultimately, it increas the risk of centralization in the network. Also, it’s an unfair game for players that can afford to run at 0% and cover costs until grow delegate stake significantly and make money from block rewards and MEV fees.

I’d prefer to use other criteria based on performance and tenure of validators, as opposed to the triage being the 0% commission. Currently, all 200 validators that receive delegated have 0% commission. Same will happen if the distribution is done to 400 validators.

32

This proposal was premissionlessly executed via Realms as an outcome of the recent JIP-25 DAO vote.

The steward programme has been upgraded with the new scoring mechanisms and parameter updates as articulated in JIP-25.

It will take some time for the changes to manifest as stake progressively rebalances out to the expanded stake pool. We encourage all participants to independently monitor and chart progress of the changes and share your findings.

The DAO owns and controls stake pool governance and has the ability to modify the mechanisms that shape the cryptoeconomic dynamics in the pool over time.

Feel free to use this thread to discuss how this proposal embeds into practice. Your feedback and insights will guide future changes to the pool.

Further changes are proposed with the upgrade towards directed staking, do contribute to that discussion if you have feedback on the draft proposal.

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